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1 Introduction
Has declining oil price volatility contributed to a more stable macroeconomic
environment since the mid-1980s, or, do high and volatile oil prices still make
a material contribution to recessions? The views are diverse. According to
Hamilton (2009), the run-up of oil prices in 2007-08 had very similar con-
tractionary effects on the U.S. economy as earlier oil price shocks (such as in
the 1970s), and should therefore be added to the list of recessions to which
oil prices appear to have made a material contribution.1 Others argue for
a reduced role for oil as a cause of recessions the last decade(s). For in-
stance, Nakov and Pescatori (2010) and Blanchard and Gali (2008) analyze
the U.S. prior to and post 1984, and find that less volatile oil sector shocks
(i.e., good luck) can explain a significant part of the volatility reduction of
inflation and GDP growth post 1984, a period commonly referred to as the
Great Moderation in the economic literature. In addition, better (or more
effective) monetary policy (i.e., good policy) has also played an important
role, in particular for reducing volatility of inflation.
Common to studies such as Nakov and Pescatori (2010) and Blanchard
and Gali (2008), is the fact that they analyze volatility of oil price shocks
and the effectiveness of monetary policy by comparing macroeconomic per-
formance before and after a given break point in time (typically 1984). There
are several reasons why analyzing the relationship between oil price volatility
and macroeconomic volatility in a split sample framework such as this may
give misleading results. First, while the persistent decline in macroeconomic
volatility since the mid 1980s is well documented, see among others Kim
and Nelson (1999a), McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Stock and Wat-
son (2003) and Canova et al. (2007), it is not clear whether there has been
a systematic reduction in oil price volatility that coincides with this Great
Moderation. Instead, large fluctuations in the oil price seem to be a recurrent
1Since the seminal paper by Hamilton (1983), a large body of literature has appeared
documenting a significant negative relationship between oil price increases and economic
activity in a number of different countries (see, e.g., Burbidge and Harrison (1984), Gisser
and Goodwin (1986), Hamilton (1996, 2003, 2009) and Bjørnland (2000) among many
others). Higher energy prices typically lead to an increase in production costs and inflation,
thereby reducing overall demand, output and trade in the economy.
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feature of the economic environment, but with a sharp increase in volatility in
the first quarter of 1974 standing out, see Figure 1.2 Second, policy may also
have changed multiple times in the last decades. For instance Bikbov and
Chernov (2013) show that although policymakers were less concerned with
the stabilization of inflation in the 1970s than from the mid 1980s, during
several brief periods in the 1990s and 2000s has the stabilization of inflation
also prompted less concern. And when agents are aware of the possibility of
such regime changes, their beliefs will matter for the law of motion underlying
the economy, see e.g., Bianchi (2013).
This paper instead analyzes the role of oil price volatility in reducing
macroeconomic instability using a Markov Switching Rational Expectation
(MSRE) New-Keynesian model. The model accommodates regime-switching
behavior in shocks to oil prices, macro variables as well as in monetary pol-
icy responses. With the structural model we revisit the timing of the Great
Moderation (if any) and the sources of changes in the volatility of macroe-
conomic variables. In so doing, we make use of new solution algorithms, see
Maih (2014). The algorithms rely on Newton methods which extend Farmer
et al. (2011). The model is estimated using Bayesian techniques accommo-
dating different regimes or states within one model. We estimate models
where the sets of parameters switch independently, or in combination with
the other parameter sets, allowing for a simultaneous inference on both the
policy parameters and the stochastic volatilities.
There are by now several papers that analyze the so called good policy
versus good luck hypothesis using a regime switching framework, see e.g. Sims
and Zha (2006), Liu et al. (2011) and Baele et al. (2015). While none of these
papers analyze the effect of oil price volatility directly, oil price shocks are
often suggested candidates for the heightened volatility of the 1970s, see in
particular Sims and Zha (2006). We contribute to this literature by examining
the role of oil price volatility explicitly, allowing also for regime switching in
other demand and supply shocks and in policy responses using the MSRE
model.
2In 1974, OPEC announced an embargo on oil export to some countries supporting Israel
during the Syrian and Egypt led attack on Israel. This led to a fall in oil production and
almost a doubling in oil prices in the first quarter of 1974.
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Figure 1. Percentage change in the real price of oil (WTI)
Note: The figure shows the quarterly percentage change in the real price of oil. The vertical
red line is plotted for 1984Q1.
Furthermore, and in contrast to Blanchard and Gali (2008) and Nakov
and Pescatori (2010), we allow oil prices to be endogenously determined by
macroeconomic shocks. This follows Kilian (2009) that suggests there is a
“reverse causality” from the macroeconomy to oil prices. In particular, he
finds that if the increase in the oil price is driven by an increased demand
for oil associated with fluctuations in global activity and not disruptions of
supply capacity, economic activity may not be negatively affected, at least not
in the short run. Corroborating results are shown in Lippi and Nobili (2012)
and Aastveit et al. (2014), among others. Hence, it would seem important to
allow for different shocks to affect oil prices when examining the consequences
of an oil price increase on the U.S. economy.
Finally, while our focus is to nest the good luck and good policy hypoth-
esis with the hypothesis of reduced oil price volatility, there are alternative
hypotheses for explaining the rise of macroeconomic stability since the mid-
1980s. In particular, the share of oil in consumption and production in the
industrialized world is smaller today than it was in the 1970s, suggesting a
dampened effect of oil prices on the macroeconomy, see Blanchard and Gali
(2008) and Nakov and Pescatori (2010) among others. For completeness, we
also examine this, and some other related hypotheses, in a Markov Switching
framework in the end.
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We have three major findings. First, our results support regime switch-
ing behaviour in monetary policy, U.S. shock volatility and oil price shock
volatility. The model that performs best is the model where all three sets of
parameters are allowed to change. Hence, both good luck and good policy
matter.
Second, we find no break in oil price volatility to coincide with the Great
Moderation, nor do we find that a dampening of the transmission of oil price
shocks matter. Instead, we find several short periods of heightened oil price
volatility throughout the whole sample, many of them preceding the dated
NBER recessions. If anything, the post-1984 period has had more episodes
of high oil price volatility than the pre-1984 period. According to our results,
then, we cannot argue that a decline in oil price volatility was a factor in
the reduced volatility of other U.S. macroeconomic variables post-1984. In-
stead, we confirm the relevance of oil as a recurrent source of macroeconomic
fluctuations, not only in the past but also in recent times.
Third, the most important factor reducing macroeconomic variability is
a decline in the volatility of structural shocks (demand and supply). In all
the model variants, the break date is estimated to occur in 1986. That is not
to say there were no spurs of volatility since then. However, these periods of
heightened macroeconomic volatility have been much briefer, maybe because
in addition a more credible monetary policy regime, responding more strongly
to inflation, was in place since 1981/1982.
Going forward, if indeed the recurrent spikes in oil prices are causal factors
contributing to economic downturns, the Federal Reserve should pay atten-
tion to the short-run implications. We find no evidence that the effects of
these spikes have been smaller since monetary policy became more credible.
Quite the contrary. Thus, the evidence presented here suggests that the Fed-
eral Reserve should give careful consideration to the possible consequences of
shocks to commodity prices when designing monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the New-Keynesian model, and the general framework for the MSRE model.
In Section 3 we present the results and demonstrate that our baseline model
is preferred, while Section 4 shows that the results are robust to alternative
specifications. Section 5 concludes.
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2 A regime switching New-Keynesian model
The model we use relates to Blanchard and Gali (2008). It is a standard
small scale New-Keynesian model, consisting of an IS-equation, a forward
looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve, a Taylor rule, and an oil price equation.
We differ from the setup in Blanchard and Gali (2008) in three respects:
(i) We allow for feedback from the macroeconomy to the oil price; (ii) we
assume a more general Taylor rule (allowing for interest rate smoothing);
and, importantly, (iii) we allow for regime switches in the parameters and
the shock volatilities. We deliberately focus on a small-scale model, so as
to allow for rich dynamics from the time-varying specification. This also
facilitates comparison with previous studies analyzing the role of oil prices
for macroeconomic stability in constant-parameter models.
In the setup described below, we allow for three regimes, which could be
a composite of states from different Markov chains. The first chain governs
the general macroeconomic volatility and is denoted Smt . The second chain
governs the policy parameters, and is denoted Spt . Lastly, we include a chain
that governs the volatility of shocks to the oil price. We denote this by Sot .
More details on the specification and estimation of the Markov chains will be
provided in the subsequent sections below.3
2.1 The log-linearized model
Below we specify the main equations of the log-linearized model. Additional
details can be found in Appendix A. Small letters denote logarithms of the
variable. We start by specifying the IS-equation for the output gap (yt) that
governs the demand side of the economy
yt = Et[yt+1]−
(
rt − Et[pit+1]
)
+ Λst + zd,t, (1)
where rt is the interest rate, pit is inflation, st is the real price of oil and Λ
captures the direct effect of oil prices to the output gap. This equation is
3In section 4.3, we also examine some alternative hypothesis for the Great Moderation; such
as whether a smaller share of oil in consumption and production may have weakened the
transmission of oil price shocks over time. We find that such hypothesis play a minor role
for describing the data.
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derived from the intertemporal Euler equation that relates optimal consump-
tion today to expected consumption tomorrow. Λ ≥ 0 illustrates that ceteris
paribus, a rise in st make firms substitute away from oil and towards labour.
This factor substitution implies higher output (GDP) because labour, not oil,
represents value added, see Blanchard and Gali (2008).
The inflation dynamics in the model is governed by a forward-looking
New-Keynesian Phillips curve
pit = βEt[pit+1] + κyt + Γst + zs,t, (2)
where β is the subjective discount factor, κ is the effect on inflation from
a change in the output gap, and Γ gives the direct effect from oil prices to
inflation (i.e., an oil price markup). Note that the oil price markup enters
the Phillips curve like a cost-push term. Γ ≥ 0 determines the effect on
domestic markups of a rise in st. A rise in st leads to higher marginal cost of
production, and when prices are sticky, to a temporary decline in the markup
of firms. Firms raise prices in an attempt to stabilize the markup. Thus,
higher oil price translates into producer price inflation, see Blanchard and
Gali (2008).
Both the demand, (zd,t), and the supply shifter, (zs,t), are given as AR(1)
processes
zd,t = ρdzd,t−1 + d,t, where d,t ∼ N
(
0, σd
(Smt )2) (3)
zs,t = ρszs,t−1 + s,t, and s,t ∼ N
(
0, σt
(Smt )2) (4)
where ρd is the persistence of the shock to the IS-equation and ρs is the
persistence of the shock to the Phillips equation.4 The shock specification for
the IS and Phillips curves specify that the demand and supply shocks follow
the same chain, Smt , i.e., they will switch together (but not necessarily in the
same direction).
Monetary policy is governed by a Taylor rule of the following form
rt = ρr
(Spt )rt−1 + (1− ρr(Spt ))[φpi(Spt )pit + φy(Spt )yt]+ σrr,t, (5)
4We also estimate the IS-equation and the Phillips curve equation as hybrid functions,
allowing for both backward- and forward-looking terms. In this case the demand and
supply shifter will be N(0, 1). Results are robust to such changes.
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where φpi and φy are parameters governing the central banks responsiveness
to inflation and the output gap respectively. The parameter ρr gives the rate
of interest rate smoothing over time and r,t ∼ N (0, σ2r) is a monetary policy
shock. Importantly, we allow all parameters that the monetary authorities
may have control over to switch throughout the sample. The policy parame-
ters follow the same chain, Spt , implying they will switch together, (albeit not
necessarily in the same direction).5
Blanchard and Gali (2008) model the oil price process as an AR(1) pro-
cess. Here, we also allow the oil price to respond to macroeconomic shocks.
As motivated above, Kilian (2009) and others have shown that changes in
demand can be an important oil price driver. We will therefore assume that
the oil important country (the U.S.) is large and potentially can affect oil
prices through increased consumption.6 To account for such a simultaneity,
we allow for a direct feedback effect from the output gap to the oil price
st = ρost−1 + ζyt + o,t, where o,t ∼ i.i.d.N
(
0, σo
(Sot )2) , (6)
ρo is a persistence parameter and ζ gives the feedback from the macroeconomy
(i.e., the output gap) to the oil price. The notation used for the variance
makes it clear that the volatility of an oil price shock can vary according to
different regimes, Sot .
2.2 Markov Switching Rational Expectation framework
The model outlined above can be cast in a general Markov Switching Rational
Expectation (MSRE) framework. Below we lay out the general framework
for this MSRE model. All models in this paper are estimated using Bayesian
methods, and the computations for solving and estimating the models are
5In Section 4.3, we also estimate a model where we allow the variance of the monetary policy
shock, σr, to also switch. Our main results remain invariant to this augmentation.
6We approximate the world economy with the U.S. output gap. We believe this to be a
realistic approximation inasmuch as U.S. is the main consumer of petroleum products and
an important driver of the oil price during the sample period. Having said that, since the
start of the century, emerging economies, China in particular, have increased consumption
of natural resources and thereby also potentially affected the oil price, see Aastveit et al.
(2014). Still, Section 4 demonstrates that our results are robust to alternative measures of
global activity.
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performed using the RISE toolbox.7 The advantage of these procedures is
that the likelihood is evaluated at each point in time under the different
regimes. This information, through a Bayesian filtering scheme, is used to
update the probabilities of being in different states. So even if there was only
one outlying observation (such as the oil price shock of 1974), the estimation
procedure would still pick it up, perhaps as a change in volatility.
To allow for regime switching in the parameters and shock processes, we
first cast the New Keynesian model into the general MSRE system given by
Et
{
A+(St+1)xt+1 + A0(St)xt + A−(St)xt−1 + B(St)t
}
= 0, (7)
where the vector xt ∈ Rn×1 contains the n endogenous variables, and the
vector t ∈ Rl×1 contains the l structural shocks, where t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, Il).
The parameter matrices take the following form, A+(St+1),A0(St),A−(St) ∈
Rn×n and B(St) ∈ Rn×l, where St denotes the different states of the system.
That is, the MSRE framework allows the model economy to be in different
regimes at certain times. Each regime can be described as a specific state
where the economy is governed by certain separate rules specific for that state.
In general, we can have h different regimes so that St ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}. The
probabilities of moving between regimes are given by a transition probability
matrix
P = [pSt,St+1] =

p11 · · · p1h
...
. . .
...
ph1 · · · phh
 , where h∑
j=1
pij = 1 ∀i.
where the probability pij = Pr
(St+1 = j∣∣St = i), is the probability of moving
from regime i this period into regime j the next period. We assume that
the agents in the economy know the transition probability matrix, and form
expectations as follows:
Et
[
A+(St+1)xt+1
(St+1)∣∣∣St = i] = h∑
j=1
pijEtA+(St+1 = j)xt+1
(St+1 = j,St = i).
(8)
7RISE; “Rationality In Switching Environments” is a toolbox for Matlab developed by
Junior Maih. See Maih (2014) for further details.
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The agents’ expectations of the future x vector are a weighted sum over all
the possible states of the world. A general solution to the system is given in
equation (7)
xt
(St,St−1) = T(St)xt−1(St−1,St−2)+ R(St)t. (9)
In this system the parameters are allowed to switch and the traditional
stability concept for constant parameters cannot be used. We use instead
a concept from the engineering literature: mean square stability (MSS), see
Svensson and Williams (2005) and Farmer et al. (2011).8 We let the number of
possible states be h, and the transition probability matrix, P , be of size h×h.
Consider the solution to the MSRE system in equation (7) given by equation
(9). If for any initial condition x0 there exist a µ and a Σ independently of
x0 such that
lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣E[xt]− µ∣∣∣∣ = 0 and lim
t→∞
∣∣∣∣E[xtx>t ]−Σ∣∣∣∣ = 0, 9
then the system satisfies MSS. This is a requirement that the first and second
order moments of the stochastic process, {xt}∞t=0, are finite.
2.3 Data and Bayesian estimation
The data series are quarterly and span the periods 1970Q1 – 2014Q1. The
observed variables are the U.S. output gap (yt), the U.S. inflation rate (pit),
the U.S. interest rate (rt), and the real price of crude oil (st). The U.S.
output gap is calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter on U.S. real
GDP.10 The inflation rate is calculated as the first difference of the logarithm
of the U.S. GDP deflator; pit = log
(
Pt
)− log (Pt−1). For the interest rate we
observe the Federal Funds Rate. This series is quarterly but the values are
8See do Valle Costa et al. (2006), page 36, for a detailed definition.
9To check if these conditions are satisfied, a necessary and sufficient condition is that the
matrix Ξ given by
Ξ ≡ (P ⊗ In2) · diag [T(St = 1)⊗T(St = 2)⊗ · · · ⊗T(St = h)] ,
has all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle.
10We also analyze and document robustness to the HP filtering using other data transforma-
tions.
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annualized, so we calculate quarterly values. The real oil price is defined as
St = Po,t/Pt, where Po,t is the nominal price of oil, and st = po,t− pt. For the
price of oil we use the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) divided by the U.S.
GDP deflator. The series were downloaded from the FRED database.11 All
data are demeaned before the estimation.
In order to estimate the model, the likelihood has to be computed. Due to
the presence of unobserved variables, the likelihood has to be computed using
a filtering procedure. The switching process makes the standard Kalman filter
inappropriate in this case because the information up to time t includes all
the history of the states of the Markov chains. An ideal filtering procedure
should take into account all possible paths, multiplied by the number of states
at each iteration. This is infeasible. Instead, we use a filter that limits the
number of states that are carried forward at each iteration of the Kalman
filter. The filter is a combination of Hamilton (1994) and Kim and Nelson
(1999b), but with some modifications, see Maih (2014) for details.
The likelihood obtained from the filtering procedure is then combined with
the prior density of the parameters to form the posterior kernel. This posterior
kernel is maximized to get the posterior mode. The full posterior distribution
is calculated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. To find
the mode we use a stochastic grid search algorithm, which is derivate-free,
then the regions where the global peak might lie is located. The global peak
is reached using a Newton-based optimization procedure. This procedure can
be computational heavy, especially if the posterior kernel has many peaks,
see Maih (2014) for details.
3 Results
We present here the results from estimating the MSRE New-Keynesian model.
We first compare model performance for the eight different models, before
detailing the chosen model framework and implied results.
11See http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. In the FRED database, the real GDP
series is denoted gdpc1, the GDP deflator is named gdpdef, the Federal funds rate is named
fedfunds and the WTI series is named oilprice.
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3.1 Model selection
From the three independent Markov chains described above, we get eight
potential model combinations; The first model, M1, is a model without any
parameter switching, i.e., constant parameters model. It is our staring point,
from which the other models will be evaluated against. M2 refers to a model
allowing for switching in macroeconomic volatility, i.e., the variance of the
structural shocks to the IS-equation and to the Phillips equation, and with
the states of the economy denoted St = Smt . The third model, M3, allows
for switching in oil volatility, i.e., the variance of the structural shocks to the
oil price; St = Sot . M4 refers to a model allowing for switching in policy
parameters; St = Spt . The remaining four models are combinations of the
above mentioned states. M5 allows for switching in both macroeconomic
volatility and oil price volatility; St =
{Smt ,Sot }. M6 allows for switching in
macroeconomic volatility and policy; St =
{Smt ,Spt }. M7 admits switching
in oil price volatility and policy; St =
{Sot ,Spt }. Finally, M8, allows for
switching in macroeconomic volatility, oil price volatility, and policy; St ={Smt ,Sot ,Spt }. Thus, the different specifications will differ with respect to
which parameter sets are allowed to switch. This implies that all models
will be nested, allowing us to evaluate which of these specifications are most
important in explaining the data.
We adopt the convention that the variance in regime 1 is higher than the
variance in regime 2 for the structural shocks:
σd
(Smt = 1) ≥ σd(Smt = 2),
σo(Sot = 1) ≥ σo
(Sot = 2).
where the first specification refers to the macroeconomic volatility regime
(normalised so that macroeconomic volatility is high when volatility of shocks
to the IS-equation are the highest) and the second equation defines the oil
price volatility regime. Finally, we define a high monetary policy response
regime as the periods where the monetary authorities respond the most to
inflation:
φpi(Spt = 1) ≥ φpi
(Spt = 2).
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This specification assumes the policy responses to switch together, but does
not restrict the other responses to be high or low in the same regime.
The model specification is uncertain. To evaluate whether a regime switch-
ing model gives an accurate description of the data relative to a constant
parameter model, we use a statistical criterion to decide what specification
is preferred. In particular, we compute the Laplace approximation of the log
Marginal Data Density (MDD) for the constant parameter model which we
then compare with all the seven alternative regime switching models.12
Table 1 displays results and ranking of models based on the MDD. Details
of prior and posterior distributions are given below. Importantly, however, we
keep the priors constant when comparing performance across models. Clearly,
the worst performing model is,M1, the model with constant parameters. The
results show that by letting the variance of the shocks to the U.S. macroeco-
nomic variables switch (model M2), we get the largest improvement in the
MDD. Allowing for switches in oil price volatility (M3), improves the MDD
substantially as well, while allowing for switches in the Taylor rule (M4)
yields the least important improvement, but still an improvement. In the
end, the model that suggests the largest improvement in MDD is the model
that allows all three chains to switch, i.e., model M8. In the following we
denote this as the baseline model and present details below.13
3.2 Priors and parameter estimates
Table 2 displays prior and posterior distributions for the baseline model,
M8. We report 90 percent probability intervals for both the priors and the
posteriors together with the mean for the posterior. When choosing the priors,
we use related literature for guidance. There are by now several studies that
estimate a Markov-switching model with switches in volatility and policy, see
e.g. Bianchi (2013) and Liu et al. (2011). Our work is novel in estimating
a model with oil prices, so here we lack guidance. Our starting point in
12Recall, with three independent Markov chains (oil volatility, macroeconomic volatility,
and policy parameters), we will have eight possible model combinations, ranging from a
constant parameter model (M1) to model (M8) where all three regimes are allowed to
change.
13Details on all the various models can be given on request.
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Table 1. Model performance
Model Description Switching parameters Log-MDD Rank
M1 No parameter switching. – 2250 #8
M2 The volatility of the demand and
supply shocks can change.
σd, σs 2291 #4
M3 The variance of the oil price
shock can change.
σo 2272 #6
M4 The Taylor rule can change. φpi, φy, ρr 2253 #7
M5 M2 and M3 together. σd, σs, σo 2325 #2
M6 M2 and M4 together. σd, σs, φpi, φy, ρr 2295 #3
M7 M3 and M4 together. φpi, φy, ρr, σo 2293 #5
M8 M2,M3 and M4 together. σd, σs, φpi, φy, ρr, σo 2332 #1
Note: The table reports model performance using the logarithm of the marginal data density,
for the eight different models. The last column shows how the different models are ranked.
our choice of oil specific priors is the calibration done in Blanchard and Gali
(2008). We do not choose very restrictive priors, and we strive to capture
most parameter values that are estimated in similar studies.
For the subjective discount factor, β, we choose the bounds so that the
parameter lies within the interval [0.96, 1.00).14 For the persistence param-
eters, ρd, ρs, and ρo, we use an almost uniform prior, implemented using a
Beta distribution.15 For the parameters κ, Λ and Γ we base our priors on the
calibration in Blanchard and Gali (2008). For the policy parameters, there
are several studies we can relate to.16 For the inflation response we use a
Gamma prior with a 90 percent probability interval between 0.50 and 3.50;
for the output response we us a Gamma prior with a 90 percent probability
interval between 0.05 and 1.50; and lastly, for the interest rate smoothing pa-
rameter we choose a Beta prior with a 90 percent probability interval between
14To ease the computations we estimate a transformation of β, given by β˜ ≡ 100(β−1 −
1). β˜ follows a Gamma distribution where we choose the bounds so that the 90 percent
probability interval of β˜ is [0.2, 4.0].
15We use a Beta distribution instead of a uniform distribution as we want to avoid values of
the persistence parameter equal to 1.
16For a linear Taylor rule see Liu et al. (2011), while for a Taylor rule with switching more
in line with our setup, see Bianchi (2013).
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0.05 and 0.95. For the shock volatilities we set priors based on the volatility
of an subsample of the data. The priors for the transition probability matrix
are set according to similar studies, e.g. Bianchi (2013). The priors are given
in the rows 2–4 in Table 2.
We start by describing the results for the constant parameters. First, we
estimate the subjective discount factor, β, to 0.97, which corresponds to a
quarterly rate of interest of 3 percent. The persistence parameters ρd, ρs,
and ρo, are, in line with many other studies, estimated to be fairly high:
0.91, 0.75, and 0.97 respectively. κ is estimated to be 0.06, emphasizing a
substantial response in inflation to the output gap. Λ and Γ are estimated to
be 0.0007 and 0.0006, suggesting a non-negligible response in the output gap
and inflation to oil price variation. Finally, we find ζ to be 0.45, suggesting a
simultaneous response in the oil price to macroeconomic conditions, a feature
also found in many empirical studies such as Kilian (2009).
Turning to the parameters governing the high and low macroeconomic
volatility regime, we find a clear difference between the various regimes. In
particular, the standard deviation of demand shocks is found to be three times
higher in the high volatility regime than in the low volatility regime. Further,
the standard deviation of supply shocks switches in the same direction as
the demand shock, and is estimated to be more than twice the size in the
high relative to the low volatility regime. Overall we find the probability of
moving from high to low volatility regime to be 10 percent, which is slightly
higher than moving from the low to high volatility regime (8 percent). Based
on these numbers, we can also calculate the expected duration times of each
regime over this specific sample. Doing so we find the high macroeconomic
volatility regime is expected to last for 10.4 quarters, while the low volatility
regime lasts 12 quarters.
Regarding oil price shocks, we confirm again a substantial difference be-
tween the high and low volatility regimes. In particular, a standard deviation
shock to the oil price in the high volatility regime is 26 percent while it is
7 percent in the low volatility regime. Furthermore, the probability of mov-
ing from the high to the low oil price volatility regime is 14 percent, which is
twice as high as the probability of mowing from low to high oil price volatility
regime. In line with this, the expected duration time in the high oil volatility
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Table 2. Prior and posterior distributions for the model M8
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Parameter Distribution 5%–95% Mean 5%–95%
Constant parameters:
β Gamma 0.96–1.00 0.97 0.93–1.00
κ Beta 0.05–0.30 0.06 0.01–0.21
ζ Uniform 0.05–2.00 0.45 0.03–0.92
ρd Beta 0.05–0.95 0.91 0.87–0.96
ρs Beta 0.05–0.95 0.75 0.66–0.97
ρo Beta 0.05–0.95 0.97 0.95–0.99
100σr Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.20 0.18–0.27
100Λ Gamma 0.01–1.00 0.07 0.00–0.26
100Γ Gamma 0.01–1.00 0.06 0.03–0.53
Switching macro volatility:
100σd(Smt = 1) Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.42 0.27–0.53
100σd(Smt = 2) Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.14 0.08–0.19
100σs(Smt = 1) Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.15 0.10–0.26
100σs(Smt = 2) Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.05 0.04–0.10
pm12 Beta 0.05–0.15 0.10 0.06–0.14
pm21 Beta 0.05–0.15 0.08 0.05–0.13
Switching oil volatility:
σo(Sot = 1) Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.26 0.20–0.35
σo(Sot = 2) Inv. Gamma 0.05–1.00 0.07 0.06–0.08
po12 Beta 0.05–0.15 0.14 0.09–0.20
po21 Beta 0.05–0.15 0.07 0.05–0.11
Switching policy:
φpi(Spt = 1) Gamma 0.50–3.50 1.96 1.43–3.35
φpi(Spt = 2) Gamma 0.50–3.50 1.54 1.28–1.81
φy(Spt = 1) Gamma 0.05–1.50 0.05 0.03–0.15
φy(Spt = 2) Gamma 0.05–1.50 0.74 0.16–1.02
ρr(Spt = 1) Beta 0.05–0.95 0.33 0.17–0.84
ρr(Spt = 2) Beta 0.05–0.95 0.85 0.71–0.91
pp12 Beta 0.05–0.15 0.07 0.03–0.16
pp21 Beta 0.05–0.15 0.15 0.05–0.24
Note: Model M8 allows for switching in the macroeconomic volatility, oil price volatility,
and policy; St =
{Smt ,Sot ,Spt }. The posterior is simulated using a Metropolis Hastings
algorithm. The results are from one single chain where we use 100 000 draws. We use a
burn in of 10 percent.
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regime will be 7.3 quarters, increasing to 13.6 quarters in the low volatility
regime.
Finally, we also find a substantial difference between the parameters gov-
erning the policy regimes. In particular, the policy response to inflation is
estimated to be 1.96 in the high policy response regime, while it is 1.54 in
the low response regime. The response to the output gap, however, moves
in the other direction. The response is low (0.05) when policymakers are re-
sponding strongly to inflation (denoted the high response regime), and high
(0.74) in the low response (to inflation) regime. Note also that the interest
rate smoothing parameter is estimated to be 0.33 in the high response regime,
and 0.85 in the low response regime. This implies that the relative difference
between the parameters in the high and low policy regimes will be even larger.
Finally, the probability of moving from the low to the high response regime is
15 percent, more than twice as high as the probability of moving from a high
to low response regime. Consistent with this, the regime with the longest
duration is the high monetary response regime with an expected duration of
14.6 quarters.
3.3 Smoothed regime probabilities
The smoothed probabilities for the model are plotted in Figure 2. Panel
2a shows the smoothed probabilities for being in the high macroeconomic
volatility regime. We identify a regime with high volatility in the structural
macroeconomic shocks (i.e., shocks to the IS curve and to the Phillips curve)
for the periods prior to 1986. That is, throughout the 1970s and until 1986,
the economy is in a regime of high macroeconomic volatility. From 1986, the
economy moves into a low volatility regime. The shift from the high to the
low volatility regime in the middle 1980s is in line with the literature on the
Great Moderation, see e.g. Bianchi (2013) and Liu et al. (2011), although
we find that the shift to a low macroeconomic volatility regime occurred 1-2
years than in the above mentioned studies. In addition, we identify some
short periods of heightened volatility after 1986, mostly coinciding with the
NBER recessions.
Panel 2b shows the smoothed probabilities for the high oil price volatil-
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Figure 2. Smoothed probabilities for model M8
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
Note: Panel (a) presents the smoothed probabilities for being in the high macroeconomic
volatility regime. Panel (b) presents the smoothed probabilities for being in the high mone-
tary policy response regime. Panel (c) presents the smoothed probabilities for being in the
high oil volatility regime. The shaded areas correspond to the dated NBER recessions.
ity regime. A quick glance at the figure suggests there is no support for
the hypothesis that a fall in oil price volatility coincided with the decline in
macroeconomic instability from the mid-1980s (the start of the Great Mod-
eration) noted in many previous studies. Instead, we find that the oil price
has displayed several periods of heightened volatility throughout the sample,
many of them coinciding with the NBER recessions. Thus, we reject the
notion put forward in Nakov and Pescatori (2010) and Blanchard and Gali
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Figure 3. The inflation response, (1− ρr)φpi.
Note: The figure plots the initial response to inflation over time as the Taylor rule param-
eters for the high and low response regime weighted using the smoothed probabilities for
being in the high monetary policy response regime.
(2008), that, based on a split sample, argue that reduced oil price volatility
has contributed to increase macroeconomic stability over time.17
Looking at the graph in more detail, we identify seven periods where the
structural shocks to the oil price are in a high volatility state. Interestingly,
these episodes correspond well with the historical oil price shocks identified
in Hamilton (2013). The first and second episodes are well-known distinct
spurs of high oil price volatility: the 1973–1974 OPEC embargo; and the 1978
Iranian revolution followed by the Iran-Iraq war of 1980. Both episodes led to
a fall in world oil production, an increase in oil prices and a gasoline shortage
in the U.S., see Hamilton (2013) for more details. Between 1981 and 1985,
Saudi Arabia held production down to stimulate the price of oil, until, in 1986
they brought production up again, which led in turn to a collapse in the oil
price. This sharp fall in 1986 coincides with our third episode. The fourth
episode in 1990/1991, coincides with the first Persian Gulf war during which
Iraqi production collapsed and oil prices again shot up. The fifth episode is
slightly more persistent than the previous episodes and coincides with the
East Asian Crisis around 1997/1998 and what Hamilton (2013) calls a period
17 Herrera and Pesavento (2009) also analyze the contribution of oil prices shocks and sys-
tematic monetary policy to the Great Moderation by splitting the sample. They report
that an oil price shock had a larger and longer-lived effect on output and inflation in the
pre-Volcker period. They also find that systematic monetary policy helped stabilize the
economy during the 1970s, but had no effect after the mid-1980s.
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of resumed growth.18 The sixth episode coincides with the Venezuelan unrest
and the second Persian Gulf war 2001/2002. The seventh episode, 2007–2009,
coincides with what Hamilton (2013) calls a period of growing demand and
stagnant supply. The probability of a high oil price volatility regime shoots
up before the last NBER recession, suggesting high oil price volatility may
also have played a role here.
Panel 2c shows the smoothed probabilities for the high monetary policy
response regime. There is a widespread belief that the more Hawkish policy
imposed by the Chair of Federal Reserve Paul Volcker helped bring down
the high inflation that persisted during the 1970s, see e.g. Clarida et al.
(2000)and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004). Our results support this view that
the FED’s response to inflation grew stronger after Volcker took office. More
specifically, we identify a switch to a more hawkish regime around 1982. A
similar shift to a more responsive policy regime around that time was also
found by Bianchi (2013) and Baele et al. (2015). The regime is in place until
the end of the financial crisis, when the probability of being in the hawkish
regime declines to less than 0.5 percent.
Figure 3 illustrates our results further. In that figure we graph the Taylor
rule coefficient on inflation during the periods of the different Chairs of the
Federal Reserve. There is a clear shift towards a higher inflation response
during the Volcker period, since which it has remained fairly stable, inter-
rupted briefly by Chairman Ben Bernanke’s intervention during the global
financial crisis.
To sum up, we nest the “Good luck” hypothesis and find that a reduction
in volatility of demand and supply shocks coincides with the general decline
in volatility in the U.S. economy, although not before 1986. Further, the
volatility reduction is not permanent, and we also identify some brief periods
of high macroeconomic volatility throughout the 1990s and 2000s. We also
nest the “Good policy” hypothesis, and find that the FED moved into a
regime of responding more strongly to inflation around 1982. As to the oil
price, we do not find declining oil price volatility to play a separate role for
the observed volatility reduction in the U.S. economy.
18During this period the oil price fell below $12, the lowest price since 1972.
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3.4 Oil and the macroeconomy
Having observed the coinciding pattern of heightened oil price volatility and
the NBER-dated U.S. recession, a natural follow up question is how an oil
price shock affects the macroeconomy in the different policy regimes. More
specifically, is it the oil price shocks that depress output over time, or are
the recessions that followed the severe oil shocks instead caused by the Fed-
eral Reserve’s contractionary response to inflationary concerns? Bernanke
et al. (1997) presented key evidence supporting this latter view, demonstrat-
ing that, had it not been for the Federal funds rate responses (of an increased
interest rate) to the oil shock, the economic downturns might have been
largely avoided.
Figure 4 goes a long way in answering these questions. It displays the
responses associated with the oil price shock to output and inflation in both
the high and low monetary response regimes. The oil price is normalized to
increase with 24 percent on impact, corresponding to a one standard deviation
shock in the high oil price volatility regime. The figure has two take-away
points. First, independent of whether monetary policy is in the low or high
monetary policy regimes, inflation increases and output eventually falls for a
prolonged period of time following an adverse oil price shock. This suggests
an independent role for oil price shocks in past and present NBER dated
recessions, in line with the arguments put forward in Hamilton (2009).
Second, the negative effect on output of an oil price shock is magnified
when the policymakers are in the high policy response regimes. In particular,
when monetary policy is responding more aggressively to inflation, output
falls by more than 0.3 percent within a year, compared to the 0.1 percent
decline in the low policy response regime. The reason, of course, is that the
increase in interest rates, although effectively curbing inflation, will exacer-
bate the oil-led contraction of the economy. Thus, and in line with results
of Bernanke et al. (1997), the effect of an oil price shock is most severe in
the high policy response regime, whereas for inflation the opposite is the
case. However, as it turns out, since the policymakers have been in the high
response regime since the early 1980s, oil price shocks have been most con-
tractionary for the U.S. economy in the period of the Great Moderation, and
21
Figure 4. The effects of an oil price shock
Note: The effects of a one standard deviation oil price shock in the high oil price volatility
regime (24 percent) to output and inflation. The 67.5 percent credible bands are plotted.
not just in the Volcker area as suggested in Bernanke et al. (1997).
4 Extensions
We began this paper by questioning whether a reduction in oil price volatil-
ity could be partly responsible for the Great Moderation, that is, a period
of stable economic conditions from the mid-1980s. Our results suggest that,
contrary to common perception, there is no support for the role of oil price
shocks in reducing macroeconomic instability. Instead we find the usual sus-
pects of “Good luck” and “Good policy” in explaining the Great Modera-
tion. There are, however, alternative hypotheses for explaining the rise of
macroeconomic stability since the mid-1980s. Below we examine two of these
hypothesis before addressing other extensions related to model specification
and estimation.
4.1 Declining oil dependence
The share of oil in consumption and production in the industrialized world
is today smaller than it was in the 1970s. Blanchard and Gali (2008) ar-
gue that these declining oil shares play an important role in explaining the
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reduced impact of oil prices on output and inflation over time. Nakov and
Pescatori (2010) also argue that the transmission of oil price volatility has
been dampened since the mid-1980s, thereby contributing effectively to the
Great Moderation.19
To examine the hypothesis of a reduced transmission (or dependence)
of the oil price shocks, we allow the parameters Λ and Γ that govern the
response in respectively output and inflation to an oil price shock to switch.
We denote model M9 as the model that allows for switching only in the oil-
macroeconomic response, and normalize the high dependence regime to be a
regime where the transmission of oil price shocks to inflation is the largest. We
also add switching in the oil-macroeconomic dependence to our main model
M8 and call this model M10. Model M10 is then a model with 4 different
Markov chains meaning that we have a total of 16 possible regimes.
The results (see Table 3 in Appendix B.1 for details) suggest that allowing
for switches in only Λ and Γ (modelM9), produces a much worse performance
(in terms of MDD) than our constant specification in modelM1, and is there-
fore a poor explanation of the changing volatility in the macroeconomic data.
For model M10, the performance also falls relative to our best performing
model M8, but the difference is now minor, suggesting that switching in
the macroeconomic dependence may add new features to the baseline regime
switching model deserving of attention.
To illustrate this, Figure 5 plots the smoothed probabilities for being in
the high oil dependence regime together with the probability of being in the
high oil price volatility regime.20 The figure shows the economy has been in
the low oil dependence regime during most of the period. Further, the low
oil dependence regime is close to our baseline with respect to the estimated
parameter values for Λ and Γ. Interestingly, we note that the probability
of being in the high oil dependence regime increases in between the high oil
volatility periods. This is most notable in the early 1980s, briefly in 1989, and
then again from 2003 to 2007. As oil prices have increased, so has also the
19Again, in their model this is measured by splitting the sample and comparing model per-
formance in the two samples.
20The baseline results are robust to this additional regime, with the exception that the
hawkish policy regime declines somewhat during the mid-1990s, see Appendix B.1.
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Figure 5. Probability of being in the high oil dependence regime
Note: The figure shows the smoothed probabilities for being in the high oil dependence
regime. Shaded areas are NBER recessions and the black dashed line gives the probability
of being in the high oil price volatility regime.
share of energy goods and services in total consumption, see Hamilton (2009).
To the extent that we observe a marked fall in oil dependence from the mid-
1980s, it could therefore in part be in response to the reduced consumption
shares in this period. Yet, impulse responses plotted in Appendix B.1 show
that, irrespectively of the oil dependence regimes, an oil price shock still has
a substantial and significant contractionary effect on output and inflation,
although more so in the high oil dependence regimes.
4.2 Volatility of monetary policy shocks
In our baseline model we allow the policy parameters in the Taylor rule to
change, but keep the volatility of monetary policy shocks, σr, constant in
all periods. This is in contrast to Liu et al. (2011), Bianchi (2013), and
Baele et al. (2015), who argue that volatility of monetary policy shocks (i.e.,
discretionary policy) should also be allowed to change.21 One reason for this
choice, is that during recessions or after large shocks (such as the oil price
shocks), the Fed is more willing to deviate from its interest rate rule. This
could then also explain an important part of the change in macroeconomic
dynamics. However, since we are including oil prices explicitly in the model,
thereby allowing the Fed to respond to oil prices via its effect on output and
inflation, policy errors due to omitted variables may be of less concern.
21In the case of Liu et al. (2011), only discretionary policy is allowed to change, at the cost
of leaving the systematic policy (the Taylor rule coefficients) unchanged over the sample.
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Still, it is interesting to examine the role of discretionary (unsystematic)
monetary policy in reducing overall macroeconomic volatility. In so doing we
follow Baele et al. (2015) in letting σr switch according to its own independent
Markov chain. That is, we allow the origins of the shocks to be different.
Results suggest that allowing for changing volatility in unsystematic policy
gives no value added once we have allowed for oil price volatility to switch.
Hence, our results remain robust, see Figure 8 in Appendix B.2.
4.3 Additional model extensions and robustness tests
We have estimated the model using a number of alternative data compositions
and model specifications. As described in greater detail in Appendix C.1, the
main conclusions of the paper are robust to all of these alternatives. Below,
we provide a brief summary.
First, we estimate the models using a truncated estimation sample, ex-
cluding data from 2007:Q1. This alternative experiment excludes the financial
crisis and the period thereafter from the sample. One argument for excluding
this period is that during the financial crisis and after, monetary policy as-
sumed a form our model cannot account for (zero-lower bound, quantitative
easing). Another argument is that while our set-up is for an oil importing
country, lately, the U.S. has relied more on home produced oil and gas and is
therefore less dependent on imports. This could change the results. Exclud-
ing the last few years, still we find that the importance of macroeconomic
volatility is prevalent. In fact, the responses obtained using the truncated
sample are not significantly different from each other. If anything, the results
based on the truncated estimation sample are stronger, in line with what we
suggested here, see Figure 9 in Appendix C.1.
Second, the output gap is not observed. As discussed in Appendix C.1,
the results reported in Section 3 are not affected by changing how we measure
this variable, using, for instance, a band-pass filter.
Third, Aastveit et al. (2014) has shown that demand from emerging coun-
tries has been an important driver of the oil price the last decade. To test the
implication of this, we include an index of global demand (OECD) directly.
Results do not change must using this index, most likely as the business cycles
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have been synchronized in the OECD.
We have also conducted a series of other robustness checks, for which
details can be provided on request. In particular, the inclusion/exclusion of
alternative measures of inflation, additional lags in the Phillips and IS curve
will potentially also affect the estimates. Still, the main results are robust
to estimating the models using these alternative representations. Lastly, our
results seem robust to different prior specifications.
5 Conclusion
This paper revisits the role of oil price volatility in reducing general macroeco-
nomic volatility by estimating Markov Switching Rational Expectation New-
Keynesian models that accommodate regime-switching behavior in shocks to
oil prices, macro variables as well as in monetary policy. With the structural
model we revisit the timing of the Great Moderation (if any) and the sources
of changes in the volatility of macroeconomic variables. We have three major
findings. First, our results support regime switching in monetary policy, U.S.
shock volatility and oil price shock volatility. The best fit model is is when
both the volatility of shocks and systematic monetary policy are allowed to
change. Hence, both good luck and good policy matter.
Second, we do not find a break in oil price volatility from the mid-1980s
that coincides with the Great Moderation. What we find instead is several
short periods of heightened oil price volatility throughout the whole sample,
many of them preceding the dated NBER recession. If anything, the post-
1984 period has had more episodes of high volatility than the pre-1984 period.
Hence, according to our results, we cannot argue that declining oil price
volatility was a factor in the reduced volatility of other U.S. macroeconomic
variables. Instead, and in contrast to common perceptions, we confirm the
relevance of oil as a recurrent source of macroeconomic fluctuations.
Third, the most important factor reducing macroeconomic variability is
the decline in volatility of structural shocks (demand and supply). In all the
model variants, the break date is estimated to occur in 1986. That is not
to say there has not been any spurs of volatility since then. However, these
periods of heightened macroeconomic volatility have been much briefer.
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Thus, if indeed the recurrent spikes in oil prices are causal factors con-
tributing to economic downturns, the Federal Reserve should give careful
consideration to the possible consequences of shocks to commodity prices
when designing monetary policy.
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Appendices
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Appendix A The New-Keynesian model
The model we use is in most respects a standard New-Keynesian model ex-
tended to include an oil sector. The model is based on the model developed
in Blanchard and Gali (2008). Because we follow their model so closely, we
refer to that paper for details. Here we lay out the fundamental equations for
the log-linearized model outlined in Section 2.
Households
We start from the households that have the following objective
max
{CH,t,Co,t,Bt,Nt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
logCt − N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
)
, (A.1)
where consumption Ct is a combination of home produced goods CH,t and
consumption of imported oil, Co,t. Bt is a one-period risk-less bond that pays
one unit of domestic currency in the next period. Nt is hours worked. The
parameter β is the subjective discount factor and ϕ is the inverse of the Frisch
labor supply elasticity. Consumption of non-oil goods is a CES aggregate of
different varieties on the unit measure given by CH,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
CH,t(i)
ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
,
where ε is the elasticity of substitution between domestic goods.
The aggregate consumption basket is given by
Ct ≡
(
Co,t
χ
)χ(
CH,t
1− χ
)1−χ
= ΘχC
χ
o,tC
1−χ
H,t , (A.2)
where Co,t is consumption of oil, Θχ ≡ χ−χ(1 − χ)−(1−χ) and χ is the oil
share in the consumption basket. The household faces the one period budget
constraint given by
PH,tCH,t + Po,tCo,t +QtBt = WtNt +Bt−1 + Πt, (A.3)
where PH,t is a domestic price index given by PH,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
PH,t(i)
1−εdi
) 1
1−ε
.
Po,t is the price of imported oil in domestic currency. Wt is the nominal wage,
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Qt is the price of the one-period nominal risk-less domestic bond, Bt, and Πt
is gross profits.
Let’s define the CPI as Pt ≡ P χo,tP 1−χH,t . By solving the household problem
we get the intertemporal Euler equation
Qt = βEt
{
Ct
Ct+1
Pt
Pt+1
}
, (A.4)
which governs the allocation of consumption over time. We also get the
optimality condition governing the allocation of labor and consumption
Wt
Pt
= CtN
ϕ
t . (A.5)
Firms
We have a continuum of firm i on the unit interval, all producing a differen-
tiated good using the following production function
Qt(i) = AtOt(i)
αoNt(i)
αn where αo + αn ≤ 1. (A.6)
Ot(i) and Nt(i) are oil and labor input for firm i respectively. The level of
technology is constant across firms and given by At, the parameters αo and
αn are the oil share and labor share in production respectively. Aggregate
gross output is defined as
Qt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Qt(i)
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
.
We assume Calvo pricing where a fraction 1 − θ of the firms can reset their
price every period. Optimal price setting by firms gives the following first
order condition
Et
{ ∞∑
k=0
θkΛt,t+kQt+k|t
(
P ∗t −MPΨt+k|t
)}
= 0,
where P ∗t is the price set by the firms that can change the price. Qt+k|t and
Ψt+k|t are the output and the marginal cost for a firm in period t + k that
last reset its price at time t. Λt,t+k is the stochastic discount factor between
period t and t + 1 and Mp = 
−1 is the steady state gross markup. The
parameter θ is the probability that the firm must keep the price fixed for one
more period. Solving for the optimal price gives
P ∗H,t =MpEt
{∑∞
k=0 θ
kβkP H,t+kΨ
r
t+k|t∑∞
k=0 θ
kβkP −1H,t+k
}
. (A.7)
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Aggregate relationships
Gross domestic product, Yt is defined as
PtYt ≡ PH,tQt − Po,tOt. (A.8)
In equilibrium with balanced trade, Bt = 0, the total value of consumption
is equal to the total value of output minus the total value of imported oil.
PtCt = PH,tQt − Po,tOt.
Monetary authorities
We assume that monetary authorities set the interest rate according to the
following rule
Rt
R¯
=
(
Rt−1
R¯
)ρr (( Pt
Pt−1
)φpi (Yt
Y¯
)φy)1−ρr
er,t , (A.9)
where Rt is the gross interest rate, R¯ is steady state gross interest rate, and
Y¯ is steady state output. This rule says that the monetary authorities care
about both price stability and that the output gap is closed, and they respond
to inflation according to the parameter φpi and to the output gap according
to φy. We allow for interest rate smoothing according to the parameter ρr
and r,t is a monetary policy shock.
The importance of oil
The model includes oil both as a factor in production and as a consumption
good. We do not specify a production sector for oil, in the model developed
by Blanchard and Gali (2008) the oil price is assumed to follow an AR(1):
st = ρost−1 + εo,t. (A.10)
We augment this AR(1) model to allow for demand factors as possible drivers
of the oil price. In our model we use the following specification for the oil
price
st = ρost−1 + ζyt + εo,t, (A.11)
where ζ measures the direct effect of chance in the output gap on the real
price of oil.
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Appendix B Additional Figures and Tables:
Alternative hypothesis
Below we show results from examining two alternative hypotheses for the
reduction in macroeconomic volatility from the mid-1980s. Section B.1 first
examines whether the economy has become less dependent on oil, while Sec-
tion B.2 examines whether (discretionary) monetary policy has become less
volatile.
B.1 Declining oil dependence
One alternative explanation in the literature on the Great Moderation is that
the economy has become less dependent on oil, i.e., the oil share in both pro-
duction and consumption has fallen over time. This is one of the hypotheses
examined by Blanchard and Gali (2008). The parameters governing the oil
dependence of the economy are Λ and Γ. It can be shown that both pa-
rameters are increasing in the oil share in production as in the oil share in
consumption. The alternative hypothesis that oil has a dampening effect on
the macroeconomy over time can then be tested by letting parameters Λ and
Γ change over time.
We proceed then to estimate our model in which we allow for switching
in the effect from oil prices to the macroeconomy. We denote model M9 as
the model that allows for switching in oil dependence, and normalize the high
dependence regime to be St = Smot = 2 such that
Γ(Smo = 2) ≥ Γ(Smo = 1).
This gives us a model with two possible regimes, one where movements in
the oil price have a relatively large effect on the macroeconomy (dependence
is high), and one where this effect is relatively small (dependence is low).
We also estimate a model where, in addition to letting Λ and Γ switch,
we allow for all the different regimes as in our baseline model M8. We call
this specification model M10. In this specification the state of the economy
can be written as St = {Smt ,Sot ,Spt ,Smot } and we have a total of 16 different
regimes into which the economy can move. In Table 3 we report the model
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Table 3. Model performance - Alternative hypothesis
Model Description Switching parameters Log-MDD Rank
M9 The parameters in front of the
oil price in the IS- and Phillips
equation can change.
Γ,Λ 2212 #10
M10 A combination of M2,M3,
M4 and M9.
σd, σs, φpi, φy, ρr, σo,Γ,Λ 2297 #3
Note: The table reports the model performance, using the logarithm of the marginal data
density, for the models allowing for switching in the oil-macro response. The last column
shows how the two models are ranked compared to the models M1 −M8.
performance of these two alternative hypothesis. We find that allowing for
switches in only Λ and Γ (model M9), performs much worse than our con-
stant specification in model M1 based on the MDD, and is therefore a poor
explanation of the changing volatility in the macroeconomic data.
For modelM10, the performance also falls relative to our best performing
model M8, but the difference is minor, suggesting that switching in oil de-
pendence may add new features to the baseline model, deserving of attention.
The smoothed probabilities for model M10 are plotted in Figure 6. We also
graph the impulse responses to an oil price shock in the high and low depen-
dence regime in Figure 7. Interestingly, we find an oil price shock to have
a substantial and significant effect on output and inflation in both regimes,
but even more so when oil dependence is high. In particular, following a
one standard deviation oil price shock (normalised to increase oil prices by
24 percent, as in the high oil price volatility regime), output gradually falls
by close to 0.5 percent and inflation increases with 0.3 percentage points. A
similarly sized shock in the low dependence regime eventually reduces output
by close to 0.2 percent, and increases inflation with 0.09 percentage points.
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Figure 7. The effects of an oil price shock
Note: The effects of a one standard deviation oil price shock (24 percent) to output and
inflation. The 67.5 percent credible bands are plotted.
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B.2 Switching in the volatility of monetary policy shocks
Some papers specifying Markov-switching models with a Taylor rule also
allow for switching in the volatility of monetary policy shocks. There are
different ways of modeling the possibility of a switch in the parameter σr.
Bianchi (2013) uses two different Markov chains to estimate switching, one
for structural parameters and one for volatility parameters. This means that
he is bundling all volatility parameters together and forcing them to switch
together. The volatility of monetary policy shocks must therefore switch
together with the general macroeconomic volatility in the model. Another
approach is suggested by Baele et al. (2015). Here, the volatility of the dif-
ferent shocks switch according to different and independent Markov chains.
This implies that the volatility regime of the monetary policy shocks is inde-
pendent of the other regimes in the model.
Since we have shown that the origins of the shocks are very different, we
follow Baele et al. (2015) by letting the volatility of unsystematic monetary
policy (σr) switch according to its own chain. We define the chain that governs
volatility of monetary policy shocks as Srt ∈ {0, 1}. The Taylor rule can be
written in this specification as
rt = ρr
(Spt )rt−1 + (1− ρr(Spt ))[φpi(Spt )pit + φy(Spt )yt]+ σr(Srt )r,t. (B.1)
Results are given in Figure 8. The figure shows that our results remain
robust. Letting monetary policy switch on its own does not give any value
added, once we have allowed for volatility in oil price shock and in demand
and supply shocks.
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Figure 8. Smoothed probabilities
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
(d) Probability of being in the high monetary policy volatility regime
Note: The smoothed probabilities for being in the various regimes in the model where we
also allow for switching in the volatility of monetary policy shocks.
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Appendix C Robustness
C.1 Estimation of truncated sample
We analyze our results with a view to establishing their robustness to a trun-
cated sample ending before the financial crisis. From 2007, the U.S. experi-
enced a recession. Oil prices were also fluctuating wildly and the monetary
policy regime was different (zero-lower bound). We want to examine whether
these events influence our results. We therefore stop the estimation in the
last quarter of 2006. The smoothed probabilities for the estimated model on
the pre-2007 data sample is plotted in Figure 9. Results are robust to the
truncated sample.
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Figure 9. Smoothed probabilities for pre-2007 data
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
Note: The smoothed probabilities for being in the various regimes estimated for model M8
where we stop the estimation in 2006Q4.
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C.2 Measures of output gap
We estimate the output gap using the Baxter-King (BK) bandpass filter (see
Baxter and King (1999)) and the Christiano-Fitzgerald (CF) asymmetric ran-
dom walk filter (see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003)) instead of the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. The results are robust to either measure, see Figures 10 and
11.
Figure 10. Smoothed probabilities using the BK-filter
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
Note: The smoothed probabilities for being in the various regimes estimated for model M8
where we estimate the model using the BK-filter.
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Figure 11. Smoothed probabilities using the CF-filter
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
Note: The smoothed probabilities for being in the various regimes estimated for model M8
where we estimate the model using the CF-filter.
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C.3 Global output gap measure in the oil price equa-
tion
As discussed in the main part of the paper, contrary to earlier beliefs that
the oil price was purely supply driven and could be treated as exogenous,
many studies have shown that global demand is an important oil price driver,
see e.g. Kilian (2009). In our baseline model we approximate global demand
by the U.S. output gap. We believe this to be a reasonable approximation,
especially in the early parts of our sample. We proceed then to check whether
this result is robust to the inclusion of a broader output gap measure, using
the OECD – Total index obtained from the OECD database. We use data
on GDP denoted in real U.S. dollars with base year 2005, the data is in fixed
PPPs, and seasonally adjusted.
st = ρost−1 + ζyOECDt + σo(Sot )o,t (C.1)
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Figure 12. Smoothed probabilities for model with global GDP
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
Note: The smoothed probabilities for being in the various regimes in the model where we
use global GDP in the oil price equation.
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Figure 6. Smoothed probabilities for model M10
(a) Probability of being in the high macroeconomic volatility regime
(b) Probability of being in the high oil price volatility regime
(c) Probability of being in the high policy response regime
(d) Probability of being in the high oil to macro regime
Note: Panel (a) presents the smoothed probabilities for being in the high macroeconomic
volatility regime. Panel (b) presents the smoothed probabilities for being in the high mone-
tary policy response regime. Panel (c) presents the smoothed probabilities for being in the
high oil volatility regime. Panel (d) presents the probability of being in the regime with the
high oil to macro relationship.
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